Sentencing entrapment has emerged as a contested legal doctrine, challenging the boundaries of fairness in criminal law. While the broader entrapment defense, rooted in Sorrells v. United States (1932), aims to protect defendants from overreaching government conduct, sentencing entrapment addresses a more insidious tactic: the manipulation of a defendant’s conduct to inflate the sentence, rather than merely induce criminal activity. Courts and scholars grapple with the scope of this defense, especially as federal circuits split on its recognition, creating a pressing need for Supreme Court intervention.
The traditional entrapment defense turns on two competing theories: the subjective theory, which examines the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime, and the objective theory, which scrutinizes the government’s conduct. Sentencing entrapment draws from both. It questions whether the government, while ensnaring a predisposed defendant, inflated the severity of the offense through manipulation, leading to disproportionately harsh punishment.
At its core, sentencing entrapment challenges the legitimacy of a justice system that allows the government to orchestrate crimes of greater magnitude to secure longer sentences. Courts such as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have embraced this defense, recognizing the potential for governmental abuse. In contrast, circuits like the Eleventh remain resistant, leaving defendants to navigate an uneven legal terrain where the same conduct might yield radically different outcomes depending on jurisdiction.
Proponents of sentencing entrapment argue that it safeguards the integrity of criminal sentencing by ensuring that defendants are punished in proportion to their actual culpability, not the government’s contrivance. This defense extends traditional entrapment doctrines to account for the broader due process concerns raised by cases such as Jacobson v. United States (1992), which highlighted the constitutional dangers of overreaching law enforcement.
Yet the reluctance of certain circuits to recognize sentencing entrapment stems from pragmatic concerns. Critics argue that the defense may be difficult to apply consistently, opening the door for abuse by defendants and complicating investigations. Some contend that existing sentencing guidelines and judicial discretion already provide sufficient protections against inflated sentences. These arguments underscore the broader tension between law enforcement’s need for flexibility and the constitutional imperative to prevent undue government influence in criminal sentencing.
The current circuit split on sentencing entrapment underscores the need for clear judicial guidance. A Supreme Court ruling could establish a uniform standard, resolving disparities in the application of federal law and setting clear boundaries for government conduct in criminal investigations. The stakes are high: the Court must not only reconcile this legal divergence but also address the broader implications for fairness, proportionality, and justice in sentencing practices.
Without such intervention, the uneven recognition of sentencing entrapment will continue to erode the consistency of federal law, creating a patchwork system where justice depends on geography. The resolution of this issue will have far-reaching consequences for defendants, law enforcement, and the foundational principles of fairness that underpin our legal system.